The challenge is straightforward - just factor out the modulus used N. There are two approaches, one using FactorDB and one using the intended way of using Sage.
Credits to pdro solution on Cryptohack:
n = 580642391898843192929563856870897799650883152718761762932292482252152591279871421569162037190419036435041797739880389529593674485555792234900969402019055601781662044515999210032698275981631376651117318677368742867687180140048715627160641771118040372573575479330830092989800730105573700557717146251860588802509310534792310748898504394966263819959963273509119791037525504422606634640173277598774814099540555569257179715908642917355365791447508751401889724095964924513196281345665480688029639999472649549163147599540142367575413885729653166517595719991872223011969856259344396899748662101941230745601719730556631637 ''' Key observation: the number is 2033 bits and it has 30+ factors. The smallest factor will be ~2033/30 = 68 bits in the worst case (i.e. the size of all factors is even) This means we should look for algorithms whose time complexity depends on the size of their smaller factor.
A interesting challenge, we are given the modulus n, public exponent e and ciphertext ct.
n = 17258212916191948536348548470938004244269544560039009244721959293554822498047075403658429865201816363311805874117705688359853941515579440852166618074161313773416434156467811969628473425365608002907061241714688204565170146117869742910273064909154666642642308154422770994836108669814632309362483307560217924183202838588431342622551598499747369771295105890359290073146330677383341121242366368309126850094371525078749496850520075015636716490087482193603562501577348571256210991732071282478547626856068209192987351212490642903450263288650415552403935705444809043563866466823492258216747445926536608548665086042098252335883 e = 3 ct = 243251053617903760309941844835411292373350655973075480264001352919865180151222189820473358411037759381328642957324889519192337152355302808400638052620580409813222660643570085177957 From this, denote $m$ as the plaintext, we need to solve the equation $$ m^e \equiv ct \mod N $$
The above equation is equivalent to: $$ m ^ e - ct = 0 \mod N $$
The idea that I had is to use Coppersmith attack for low-exponent 3, we can find the solution to the equation quickly.
In this challenge, we are acting as the MiTM which will intercept the key exchange messages between Alice and Bob. We are able to modify the A and B - each of the shared secret by doing g^a and g^b of Alice and Bob.
The flag is sent from Alice to Bob, hence we only need to care about the response of the key exchange message from Bob to Alice. Recall that when Bob’s secret B is sent over to Alice, Alice will do B^a on her side, where a is the secret of Alice.
This takes much longer time than I would like to admit. It is known to me that ECB leads to poor diffusion of the plaintext - the classic example from the Linux penguin used in almost every cryptography book ever.
The attack, however, is not exactly clear to me at the beginning. With fuzzy memory of how AES in ECB mode, I was thinking of a scheme that xor a plaintext block with a key block to generate the corresponding ciphertext block.
An embarrassing challenge for me. The solution to this challenge is quite simple. The symmetry of the xor operation enables us to decrypt the message/plaintext $P$ from the $IV$ and ciphertext $C$. Denote the output after running block cipher encryption with key k $E_k$ to be $O$, then we have:
$$ O = E_k(IV) $$
$$ C = P \oplus O $$
xor both sides of the above equation, we have: